We propose a transparent climate debt index incorporating both methane (CH 4 ) and carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. We develop national historic emissions databases for both greenhouse gases to 2005, justifying 1950 as the starting point for global perspectives. We include CO 2 emissions from fossil sources [CO 2 (f)], as well as, in a separate analysis, land use change and forestry. We calculate the CO 2 (f) and CH 4 remaining in the atmosphere in 2005 from 205 countries using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fourth Assessment Report impulse response functions. We use these calculations to estimate the fraction of remaining global emissions due to each country, which is applied to total radiative forcing in 2005 to determine the combined climate debt from both greenhouse gases in units of milliwatts per square meter per country or microwatts per square meter per person, a metric we term international natural debt (IND). Australia becomes the most indebted large country per capita because of high CH 4 emissions, overtaking the United States, which is highest for CO 2 (f). The differences between the INDs of developing and developed countries decline but remain large. We use IND to assess the relative reduction in IND from choosing between CO 2 (f) and CH 4`c ontrol measures and to contrast the imposed versus experienced health impacts from climate change. Based on 2005 emissions, the same hypothetical impact on world 2050 IND could be achieved by decreasing CH 4 emissions by 46% as stopping CO 2 emissions entirely, but with substantial differences among countries, implying differential optimal strategies. Adding CH 4 shifts the basic narrative about differential international accountability for climate change.
differentiated responsibilities | sustainability metrics T he United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was the basis for the Kyoto Protocol and the post-Kyoto negotiations initiated at the Copenhagen Conference of Parties in December 2009, calls for allocating accountability for action on mitigation and adaptation based on "common but differentiated responsibilities" (1) . Part of the reason that this concept has not been fully implemented is lack of an acceptable metric, often termed "climate debt," that allows differentiated responsibility to be transparently measured. The most frequently applied measure of a country's responsibility for global warming is its current annual emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)*. The second most common is cumulative emissions, simply the sum total of all past emissions. Neither metric, however, fully reflects the causes of global warming, because the amount of global warming occurring at any time is actually due to the anthropogenic GHGs from past emissions still remaining in the atmosphere at a given time, a quantity that is usually intermediate between current and cumulative emissions.
Climate debt discussions have focused on carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions, the most important GHG. In particular, the emphasis has been on CO 2 emissions consequent to fossil fuel combustion and cement manufacture, which we term CO 2 (f), referring to fossil carbon. Increasingly, net CO 2 emissions from land use change and forestry (LUCF) have also garnered attention. It is not just CO 2 , however, that is causing climate change, but a suite of human activities resulting in the emissions of GHGs and aerosols, together termed climate-altering pollutants (CAPs). Indeed, CO 2 's current impact on global warming is only about one-half the total, depending on how calculated (8) . There is relatively little in the published climate debt literature, however, incorporating the impact of any GHG except CO 2 (f) (2, 9) .
In this paper, we first briefly review the rationale behind the use of climate debt metrics for determining "differentiated responsibility" and then offer an alternative to past approaches by presenting a global database of climate debt at the country level that integrates CO 2 (f) and CH 4 , the two GHGs with the most radiative forcing (RF) associated with human activity (10) , into a single combined climate debt metric.
We illustrate how a combined climate debt metric can bring GHGs with different atmospheric lifetimes together into a common measure that is a function of the GHGs' different depletion functions and RFs, but without use of arbitrary time horizons or discount rates. Difficulties in choosing among time horizons and discount rates, for example, have plagued the calculation of global warming potentials, which are used to compare current emissions of different GHGs in a common metric of carbon dioxide equivalents (11) . To investigate the issues posed by excluding or including LUCF, we also calculate a combined climate debt metric that consolidates both CO 2 (f) and LUCF as well as CH 4 by region, as this is the finest geographic scale available for the LUCF dataset.
We characterize the global landscape of historical accountability illuminated by the combined climate debt metric and demonstrate two of its applications. First, we reveal how, in addition to facilitating international comparisons, a combined climate debt metric can help prioritize among mitigation options that target different GHGs. Second, we reanalyze global patterns of health impacts from climate change to show how a combined climate debt metric alters relationships that have been examined from the standpoint of CO 2 (f) alone in previous analyses.
Although linked to the concept of "differential responsibility" in UNFCCC, we use the term "accountability" here so as to distance the concept from a moral judgment, which is a subject for another venue.
Significance
We develop a transparent climate debt index, termed international natural debt, which combines historical emissions of CO 2 from fossil sources and land use/forestry as well as CH 4 . It covers 205 countries and is a function of emissions, lifetimes, and radiative forcings. This index can be used to assess the implications of choosing between CO 2 and CH 4 control measures and facilitates more accurate international comparisons of a range of climatechange-related phenomena, as illustrated by imposed versus experienced health impacts. Including the two most important greenhouse gases in one index shifts the basic international narrative about differential accountability for climate change. 
Natural Debt
One reformulation of climate debt is "natural debt," which better reflects physical reality than either current or cumulative emissions by focusing on the amount of a country's or person's past GHG emissions that remain in the atmosphere in any given year (12, 13) . A similar concept is "ecological debt" (14, 15) . A national debt is built by borrowing financial resources from the future. Similarly, the natural debt is built by borrowing assimilative capacity of Earth's natural systems from the future, as GHGs are released faster than they can be removed by the planet. Just as with their national debt, countries have built up their infrastructure and economic wealth faster than would otherwise have occurred by borrowing against their natural debt. The size of its natural debt indicates the degree to which a country has avoided diverting resources from other economic activities to GHG control during development.
The amount of a GHG remaining in the atmosphere today is not equal to the total amount emitted throughout history because Earth's assimilative capacity removes GHGs from the atmosphere at a rate that varies with, inter alia, the physical and chemical characteristics of each GHG. Thus, the most realistic climate debt calculations allow for natural depletion over time, counting only that portion that still survives as the current debt.
An individual country's contribution to the global natural debt serves as a useful measure of its accountability for global warming that more accurately reflects physical reality than current yearly emissions, because the current global natural debt (excess remaining GHGs in the atmosphere) is what drives climate change. This allocation approach also accords with the "polluter pays principle" from environmental ethics, policy, and law, which says that those who release the pollution into the common environment should be held accountable for the costs of the resulting negative impacts imposed on others and of remediation.
The debut of a natural debt-like metric in international negotiations is attributed to the Brazilian Proposal, which recommends use of "net anthropogenic emissions" from 1840 rather than current emissions when calculating accountability for global warming (16) . This approach was not taken up in the Kyoto Protocol but remains an option discussed by the UNFCCC, by other countries [for example, China (17) ], and in the scientific literature (18, 19) . The approach was raised by various countries, most recently by the BASIC coalition of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China at the Doha COP-18 conference.
Incorporating the impacts of additional GHGs into a climate debt metric will help the metric to further reflect physical reality and send signals regarding the most appropriate control priorities. In addition, as additional GHGs are considered when allocating historic accountability, the spectrum of mitigation strategies to achieve GHG targets will enlarge. There are, however, conceptual issues with integrating additional GHGs into the climate debt metric both in combining GHGs with different RFs and lifetimes and in that available historical databases for non-CO 2 (f) GHG sources have been much less elaborated than for CO 2 (f).
Review of Historical Accountabilities
Although the "polluter pays principle" may be conceptually attractive, some observers have expressed discomfort when applied historically to a country's GHG emissions back to the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution (20) . Two classes of arguments focus on why it is unfair to hold the present accountable for the past: the past was ignorant and the present is ignorant † . Although the first warnings about greenhouse warming appeared in the century before last (24) , it can be argued that past generations acted out of ignorance in not controlling emissions, and thus their descendants should not be penalized (25) . Moreover, estimates of the emissions of GHGs become increasingly unreliable the farther back in time one goes, because they depend on records of fossil fuel use, cement production, leakage from pipelines, patterns of agriculture, etc. Even with good estimates by geography, shifting political boundaries and past dominion of one country over others could make it problematic to assign emissions to countries today, even for a GHG such as CO 2 (f) for which reasonable emissions data may be available (26) .
The counterarguments address why it is unfair not to hold the present accountable for the past; that ignorant or not, we benefitted and ignorance should not be rewarded.
People alive today have directly benefited by the actions of their ancestors in borrowing environmental assimilative capacity. The current economic standard in the United States, for example, would most likely not be as high today if previous US generations had directed more resources to emitting fewer GHGs given the state of technology at the time. In the words of Bhaskar (27) , "if current generations in the North accept assets from their parents, then it is incumbent upon them to also accept the corresponding liabilities" (emphasis in original).
Bhaskar (27) notes also that, because of past ignorance, it is not appropriate to place a moral opprobrium on past generations and their descendants for these actions. It is fair, however, to expect that current generations meet the obligations that come with the benefits they receive. Simply put, it is a matter of repaying one's debts with a fraction of the assets achieved in part by taking on the debts. Similarly, the return from successful investments made in the past for the wrong reasons, or even accidentally, still is subject to income taxes today.
In addition, if the present generation is to be expected to accept accountability for the future, it must possess a feeling of control over the future. Without any control, there can be no true accountability, because there is no reason to think the values and consequent sacrifices of today will be honored in the future. Consequently, and perhaps paradoxically, to impart a perception of control over the future, the present generation must feel somewhat constrained by past. If this generation dismisses historical accountability, what is to keep the next generation from doing so as well (28) ?
One of the best ways to encourage this and future generations to more seriously consider the long-term impacts of introducing new technology and other activities is to make it clear that they will be held accountable for problems that arise as a result of their decisions, no matter how much ignorance is claimed. With this shift in perspective, they will then be more likely to apply the appropriate caution in their choices. To not do so is to provide great incentive to remain ignorant.
International Natural Debt
To address the potential uneasiness associated with historical accountability and the practical difficulties in determining current GHG concentrations from emissions dating back to preindustrial times, we use records back to 1950
‡ . This time frame has the advantage of starting after World War II when national boundaries were altered across the globe to mostly resemble their modern form and is after the major colonial empires began to dissolve. A starting point after these two events makes calculations less subject to arbitrary assumptions that link old national boundaries to current ones. † In the context of replying to the critiques of Beckerman and Pasek (21) and others, Neumayer (22) succinctly summarizes six separate arguments for using some form of cumulative emissions as a responsibility index, including those discussed here. The philosopher Miller (23) , in contrast, offers arguments against both current and historical emissions metrics. ‡ A base year of 1950 was also used by Sagar (7), but other investigators have gone back to 1915 (29) , 1850 (30), or, in probably the first analysis done, 1800 (31). Subak (32) compares five different approaches to assessing emissions with data going back to 1860. The complexities of systematically determining emissions so long ago and assigning them to current populations, however, are daunting. Shorter periods have also been proposed, e.g., 1990 (14) .
Another justification for choosing 1950 as the starting point is that it roughly coincides with the beginning of the modern international era as indicated, for example, by the creation of the United Nations (1947), World Bank (1946), World Health Organization (1946), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, 1946), and other global institutions, such as the major private charities [Oxfam (1942) and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE, 1945)], as well as the beginning of official bilateral development aid programs. By the early 1950s, most of these organizations had taken on their modern global character. Arguably, therefore, this baseline year represents the point in world history when a large fraction of the world first accepted some shared accountability for global action, and the emergence of many developing countries from colonization, as well as modern transport and communication. International commitments focusing on climate issues are now expressed through these same 1950-era institutions via the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UNFCCC. Because it focuses on accountability developed during the modern international era, the full term for our suggested metric is "international natural debt" (IND) (which we may further specify with subscripts to indicate the precise GHGs involved).
Most previous CO 2 -based climate debt metrics have focused only on emissions from the energy and cement sectors, for which reliable databases have been widely available. We term these CO 2 emissions as CO 2 (f), for fossil carbon. In reality, humaninduced net LUCF have also contributed significantly to CO 2 emissions over time. At the country level, it is difficult to attribute LUCF empirically, because of incomplete and uncertain historical records of LUCF sinks and sources, and conceptually, due to the ambiguities of deciding which changes were natural versus human-induced and what credit to assign for avoiding degradation of carbon stocks (33) . Nevertheless, attempts have been made (34) . Also, unlike CO 2 (f), there is no appropriate baseline starting point, i.e., the start of the Industrial Revolution (35, 36) . LUCF's estimated contribution is therefore reported separately from CO 2 (f) in most of the tables and figures that follow. Given these and many other challenges inherent to attributing climate debt from LUCF, a national-level assessment is beyond the scope of this paper. We do, however, consider the implications of LUCF's inclusion through a region-level version of IND both with and without LUCF.
The most basic measure of warming by a GHG is RF, which is measured in extra energy per surface area of Earth-watts per square meter above a natural baseline (8) . We rely on the RF values reported in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) for CH 4 and CO 2 (f) in 2005 as the means to combine and compare the relative contributions by different countries. Thus, the IND enables (i) measurement of accountability in terms of the physical consequence of concern, which is increased warming as measured by RF; (ii) comparison of INDs across two GHGs with otherwise variable characteristics; and (iii) avoidance of the vexing issues of discount rates and time horizons.
In summary, we advocate a metric that, while capturing the causal drivers of climate change through RF, remains straightforward and transparent, and allows readily for future updates and modifications, including new emissions data, different RF values, and additional CAPs. Thus, IND draws on the concepts of GHG depletion and RF to "measure" climate debt as opposed to metrics relying on more opaque global climate models and other methods that may in some sense be more accurate, but are not transparent or able to be manipulated by nonspecialists quickly or without sophisticated tools. IND also relies on publicly available and frequently updated emissions datasets, contributing to the ease of future elaboration.
Results

Supporting Information summarizes IND results for all 205
countries considered in our analysis, and includes IND CO2(f)+CH4 and its components IND CO2(f) and IND CH4 ; current, total original, and total remaining emissions for CO 2 (f) and CH 4 ; and population and income data. For simplicity, we use the term "countries" to refer to all 181 countries and 24 dependencies included in the IND database. "Original emissions" refers to the amount of GHG emitted without accounting for any subsequent depletion, and "remaining emissions" refers to the amount of original emissions that remained in the atmosphere in 2005 given depletion over time (see Methods for further details).
Total Comparing the shift in rankings from charts A to C reveals that the contribution of developed countries often decreases, for example Japan's from 4.8% to 2.9%, whereas the contribution of developing countries often increases, for example India's from 3.2% to 5.3%.
Just as other metrics related to human welfare, such as income and health, are best judged on a per capita basis, per capita IND indicates the average use of the assimilative capacity of the planet by individuals within a country. Fig. 2 compares per capita IND CO2(f)+CH4 for the 10 countries (minimum population, 10 million) with the largest values and the 10 most populous developing countries. The divergence in per capita IND CO2(f)+CH4 between these two sets of countries is striking. However, even Brazil and Mexico are close to the world average per capita IND CO2(f)+CH4 . In general, CH 4 constitutes a higher fraction of climate debt in developing countries. For illustration, the mean percentage for the CH 4 proportion among the 10 most populous developing countries is 74%, compared with 28% for the 10 countries with the largest values of per capita IND CO2(f)+CH4 . Fig. 3 demonstrates the distinction between distributions of per capita IND CO2(f) and IND CH4 among countries by income, as measured by per capita gross domestic product, adjusted for purchasing power parity (GDP-PPP). The analysis includes the 153 countries in the IND database with populations greater than one million. CO 2 (f) emissions are relatively closely associated with economic development (r 2 = 0.55) and the ratio of highest to lowest per capita IND CO2(f) is more than 1,250 (Kuwait-Chad). In comparison, CH 4 emissions are far more evenly distributed across the income spectrum, and as a result, per capita income is a poorly correlated with per capita IND CH4 (r 2 = 0.085) and the ratio of highest to lowest per capita IND CH4 is only about 50 (Trinidad and Tobago-Taiwan). Table 1 presents a preliminary exploration, at a region-level (defined in Supporting Information), of LUCF's contribution to IND, contrasting IND CO2(f)+CH4 , which does not include LUCF, and IND CO2(f)+LUCF+CH4 , which does. In both the IND CO2(f)+CH4 and IND CO2(f)+LUCF+CH4 sections of the table, the United States, Europe, and China regions possess the largest total INDs, and the Oceania, United States, and Canada regions, the largest per capita INDs. As would be expected, assigning accountability for LUCF leads IND CO2(f)+LUCF+CH4 to be greater than IND CO2(f)+CH4 for all regions (except the Caribbean). The increases are proportionately much larger, however, in those tropical regions that experienced significant deforestation over 1950-2005 (Tropical South America, Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, and Southeast Asia), so much so that these regions leapfrog others in both total and per capita IND. However, intact tropical forests in these same regions, as well as undisturbed ecosystems in other regions, undoubtedly served as carbon sinks both before and after 1950. Theoretical and methodological obstacles continue to limit incorporation of this and other dimensions of LUCF into a robust climate debt metric. Such challenges serve to further motivate research into the carbon cycle across spatial and temporal scales, as well as to highlight the utility of the more transparent IND CO2(f)+CH4 .
As with any composite metric, IND is subject to uncertainty in its constituent parameters-emissions, lifetimes, and RFseach of which contributes to a different step of calculating IND. Emissions underpin IND, and uncertainty in this parameter category has the potential to reverberate across all countries (37) . To explore the sensitivity of IND CO2(f) and IND CH4 to uncertainty in emissions, we conducted Monte Carlo simulation analyses based on assumed 90% confidence intervals (CIs) for CO 2 (f) and CH 4 emissions of ±25% and ±100%, respectively, conservative assumptions in line with expert opinion (9, (38) (39) (40) . Not surprisingly, the width of 90% CIs for IND CH4 exceeded central estimates of IND CO2(f) for the many countries with substantial emissions from both sources. Similarly, the width of 90% CIs for INDs of large countries were frequently larger than the central estimates of INDs for small countries. As would be expected, both INDs were disproportionately sensitive to emissions from recent years because, for CO 2 (f), emissions have risen very rapidly, and, for CH 4 , emissions decay comparatively quickly.
In contrast to emissions, uncertainty in RFs essentially serves to renormalize all countries' IND CO2(f) or IND CH4 to a different value. Clearly, if one GHG's RF were to shift proportionately more or less than the other, this would alter the relative contribution of the two INDs to IND CO2(f)+CH4 and thereby redistribute countries. The effect of uncertainty in lifetimes lies, in a sense, between emissions and RFs. Within IND CO2(f) or IND CH4 , a change in lifetime would affect all countries, but late emitters would be affected less than early emitters. Uncertainties in life- times and RFs, reported as 90% CIs in AR4 (8) , are recapitulated in Supporting Information.
Discussion
Use of IND to allocate accountability for mitigation and adaptation could have several impacts on policy. The relative importance of different CO 2 (f) and CH 4 emission sectors for mitigation research and development would change. Effort could be put into finding ways for carbon trading and offset schemes to increasingly consider CH 4 . Less clear are the implications for negotiations related to "post-Kyoto" international climate change regime (41) . On one hand, as a group, developing countries might be considered somewhat more accountable for current warming patterns than currently perceived as a result of considering historical CH 4 emissions in addition to historical CO 2 (f). Still, however, the differences between developed and developing countries remain large.
On the other hand, a range of opportunities are revealed for engaging developing countries to reduce warming quickly while at the same time protecting health and obtaining other cobenefits from the CH 4 reductions, most of which would accrue in these same countries (42, 43) . Unlike CO 2 (f) controls, reduction in CH 4 emissions would, in comparison, rapidly lower IND CO2(f)+CH4 , thus shifting the relative impacts of different countries. In schemes that reward progress in lowering climate debt, CH 4 emitters would then hold the advantage. rate, world IND CO2(f)+CH4 in 2050 would decrease by an amount equivalent to completely ceasing global CO 2 emissions over the identical period. Although such a swift reduction, let alone an instant cessation, of emissions is not realistic for either GHG, the conclusion drawn from equating these two hypothetical scenarios reflects how slowly the atmosphere responds to changes in CO 2 (f) emissions compared with CH 4 , owing to their very different impulse response functions. It is worth emphasizing that analysis of these scenarios does not account for dramatic rises in future emissions, schemes to directly remove GHGs from the atmosphere, or impacts beyond 2050. Additionally, the analysis assumes that the impulse response functions and radiative efficiency of each GHG remains the same in 2050 as 2005. Despite these limitations and assumptions, the overarching conclusion corresponds with the results in Shindell et al. (44) of the global effects of CH 4 versus CO 2 (f) control measures on temperature.
An IND CO2(f)+CH4 in 2005 comprised of between 25-30% CH 4 represents a zone of tipping points with regards to mitigation priorities, with the specific percentage a function of how a given country's CO 2 and CH 4 emissions have evolved over time. With respect to reducing IND CO2(f)+CH4 over the coming decades, for countries with a CH 4 fraction in 2005 below this zone, CO 2 (f) control might be considered a higher priority, whereas CH 4 control might be more advantageous above this zone, and within the zone the two control options are broadly commensurate, although the relative costs, clearly, would also be important. This observation suggests an underappreciated rationale, as well as an opportunity, for emerging economies, many of which have INDs with a high percent CH 4 , to rapidly alleviate their climate debts at potentially lower cost or disruption. Additionally, the same reasoning offers further impetus to encourage focused and rapid action on CO 2 (f) by rich countries, which often have INDs with a low percent CH 4 . Of course, as control proceeds, the percen- tages will change and thus so will the relative importance of the two GHGs looking forward.
Major anthropogenic sources of CH 4 include ruminant livestock, flooded rice cultivation, waste management, and fossil fuel systems (45) (46) (47) . Although changes in emissions from livestock and rice cultivation may require changes in consumer food preferences, poor waste management and leaks from fossil fuel systems, which accounted for nearly one-half of global CH 4 emissions in 2005, can be addressed with little impact on consumption patterns. Current inventory methodologies are not comprehensive, so there are probably additional CH 4 sources that are not yet accounted for, such as abandoned landfills and oil/gas wells (48) . Leaks from fracking operations may also add to future CH 4 inventories. Substantial reductions in the major CO 2 (f) sources, namely fossil fuels, however, require substantial changes in energy systems, portions of which can be addressed in the near-term, whereas others will require long-term infrastructure changes and investments.
As demonstrated above, the bulk of warming and thus IND CO2(f)+CH4 is due to CO 2 (f), so CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels therefore must be aggressively reduced to address climate change over the long run. Controlling CH 4 emissions could be considered "low-hanging fruit" because it includes many actions that do not directly impact personal lifestyles and are amenable to regulation, although at some cost. Moreover, control of CH 4 and other shorter-lived CAPs, such as black carbon, offers a way to achieve significant protection of the climate in the next few years while society identifies and implements ways to achieve the major reductions in CO 2 (f) that will be required (44, 49) .
Distributions of Impacts and Accountabilities: The Example of Health.
IND can also be used to compare the distribution of accountability with the impacts of climate change. A major concern about climate change, for example, is the potential impacts on human health, through shifts in environmentally-mediated infectious disease patterns, extreme weather events, damage to agriculture, changes in water availability, heat stress, sea level rise, and other routes (50, 51) . Although knowledge is growing rapidly, only one detailed global assessment of these effects has been published to date as part of the World Health Organization's (WHO) Comparative Risk Assessment (CRA) Project (52) . Estimates were made of disabilityadjusted life years (DALYs) § in 2000 due to premature death and illness or injury by age, sex, and 14 world regions (defined in Supporting Information) as a result of anthropogenic climate change (54) . In the target year of 2000, the overall impact of 150,000 premature deaths annually worldwide (0.4% of global lost DALYs) is relatively small by comparison with other global risk factors. It is the future expression of ill health from climate change (avoidable risk), however, that is the main worry, rather than what has happened so far (attributable risk).
We use the WHO CRA results in our analysis, nevertheless, because it provides the only currently available consistent set of health effect estimates that allow comparison across regions and risk factors in an equivalent manner. In addition, it seems reasonable to expect that the future patterns of impacts would be similar across the world, given that most of the risk will likely be exerted as exacerbation of local baseline health conditions.
The downward trending line in Fig. 4 is taken directly from the CRA (54) and shows that the "experienced" health burden from climate change declines with increasing economic development (per capita GDP-PPP) across the 14 CRA regions ¶ . This trend in experienced health burden is to be expected in that the poorest parts of the world are less able to protect themselves from environmental stresses in general and, partly as a result, experience much higher levels of ill health from them. The upper line shows the "imposed" health burden or the same total impact distributed according to the 2005 per capita IND CO2(f)+CH4 for each region, The DALY is a measure of lost healthy life years, a more accurate measure of lost health than deaths alone as it accounts for both the degree of prematurely in the deaths as well as the severity and duration of nonfatal injuries and illnesses (53) . ¶ For a CO 2 (f)-only analog, see ref. 55 .
which trends in the reverse direction, i.e., richer regions impose more risk than poorer ones because of their natural debts. The embedded table in Fig. 4 compares the ratio of imposed to experienced impacts across regions. The poorest regions impose ∼10% of the risk they experience, whereas the richest impose ∼30,000% (300 times) the risk they experience, a difference of a factor of ∼2,000. This is the basis of the often published maps of global health inequity from climate change (56) . It is noteworthy that all regions above a per capita GDP-PPP of about $2,500 were imposing more health impact than they were experiencing early last decade.
Conclusion
A number of analysts have examined the implications of alternative ways of framing emissions to design strategies that achieve equitable climate control across countries without considering cumulative emissions (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) . More sophisticated elaborations of accountability have also been proposed, such as those related to actual cumulative RF (63) or based on weighted temperature changes (64) .
Some of these latter approaches contain within them a remaining emission calculation, similar to natural debt, but are elaborated in substantially different units and are not easily modified to include non-CO 2 (f) CAPs. They are also more difficult to associate in discrete ways with individual countries and thus to associate with other country characteristics such as income, population, and human development indices. In addition, they tend not to be transitive, i.e., not able to be directly added, subtracted, etc. Although in a sense more reflective of reality than natural debt, they often are further along the causal chain from emissions to effect and thus subject to substantially more uncertainty and require more assumptions due to the complex and evolving models on which they rely (65) .
The IND therefore represents a compromise between the oversimplification and somewhat misleading nature of current or cumulative emissions as the accountability metric and the complex, difficult to explain, and often-changing expressions of climate change impacts resulting from modeling. It has the advantage also that individuals and organizations can duplicate and update the index themselves without waiting for new modeling results, which may not be easily interpreted by nonexperts or differences among models that cannot be quickly resolved even by experts. It is thus substantially more transparent and meets the criterion of being a "good enough" tool (66) . With the addition of the second major GHG, CH 4 , the IND is even more reflective of the full physical reality and provides signals related to control of shorterlived pollutants that would be lost in a CO 2 (f)-only index.
IND CO2(f)+CH4 reveals that the bulk of accountability remains with the more developed countries, although there is a shift in the balance of accountability toward less developed countries compared with a CO 2 (f)-only perspective because the CH 4 proportion of a country's climate debt is roughly an inverse function of income. In contrast, compared with wealthier economies, CH 4 reductions in poorer parts of the world can result in comparatively rapid reductions in these countries' climate debts, as CH 4 is often a significant portion of the debt, while having a major impact on global warming within this century.
Use of IND to allocate accountability in international negotiations for action on GHG mitigation and adaptation could help address the "differentiated responsibilities" portion of the UNFCCC. By itself, however, it is not enough to determine payments or obligations. Under the "respective capabilities" clause of the UNFCCC, actual payments for remediation or adaptation in an international regime would require implicit or explicit assessment of ability to pay and additional factors including safeguards against promoting population growth (5, 20) .
Although CO 2 (f) and CH 4 are the GHGs that contribute the most to RF, even more accurate signals might be given for mitigation if a more full accounting were available by including N 2 O, the F gases, and other CAPs such as black carbon. Even in its present form, however, the IND is a useful approach for attributing RF from human emissions of CAPs that provides a window into the way CH 4 reductions can help slow warming over the coming decades, thus allowing significant progress to To attribute this IND among 205 countries and dependencies, collectively representing over 99% of the world's population and economy, we devised a five-step procedure, executed in parallel for each GHG, to apply to each country in the analysis (see flowchart in Supporting Information). For simplicity, we use the term "countries" to refer to all 181 countries and 24 dependencies included in our IND database. Together, these 205 political entities comprise ∼90% of those covered by the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Statistics Division. In an ensuing final step, we combined each country's IND CO2(f) and IND CH4 to generate its IND CO2(f)+CH4 .
Step 1. We developed a database of country-level time series of original emissions of CO 2 (f) and CH 4 . "Original emissions" refers to the amount of GHG emitted by a country during a particular year without accounting for any subsequent depletion. The database was derived from datasets that, in addition to meeting our geographic and historical requirements, met the following criteria: (i) free and publicly available, (ii) frequently updated, (iii) having well-documented methodologies with estimates of uncertainty, and (iv) widely referenced.
Given these criteria, we drew on datasets for CO 2 (f) from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) (67) and for CH 4 The CDIAC CO 2 (f) dataset included emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement manufacture, and gas flaring in oil fields, corresponding to Common Reporting Framework (CRF) categories 1A, 2A1, and 1B2C1, respectively (73) . To construct complete and consistent time series of CO 2 (f) emissions, adjustments to the CDIAC dataset were necessary to account for, most notably, changes in the boundaries of countries (see Supporting Information for details on this and additional minor adjustments).
Over 1950-2005, 30% of countries in the IND database experienced a boundary change unaccounted for by the CDIAC dataset. For unifications, we merged the time series of the component countries. For partitions, we used cumulative emissions during the first 5 y postpartition of each component country to proportionally weight the attribution of emissions prepartition. Fourteen percent of all country-years were adjusted in one these two ways.
The EDGAR CH 4 dataset included emissions from energy, industry, agriculture, waste, and wildfires (forest and grassland), corresponding to CRF categories 1, 2, 4, 6, and 5B, respectively (73 Step 2. We calculated the amount of original emissions from each country for each year that remained in the atmosphere in 2005, given depletion over time. The phrase "remaining emissions" refers to such amounts. We based our calculations on the impulse response functions or lifetimes, which model the decay of GHGs over time, for CO 2 (8) .
To illustrate the use of these equations and the different decay dynamics of CO 2 (f) and CH 4 , consider 1,000 tons of each GHG emitted in 1990. The amount of these original emissions still present in the atmosphere in 2005 would be 605 tons of CO 2 (f) and 178 tons of CH 4 . If these 1,000 tons of each GHG had been emitted in 1950, then remaining in 2005 would be 423 tons of CO 2 (f) and 2 tons of CH 4 .
As a result, although our database only extends back to 1950, for CH 4 in particular there would be little difference (estimated <0.1% at the global level) in accounting for remaining emissions in 2005 were original emissions before 1950 included. A comparatively greater fraction of CO 2 (f) remaining emissions in 2005 were originally released before 1950, but this fraction is nonetheless not vast, given the rapid rise in emissions during recent decades (67) . Applying Eq. 1 to CDIAC's global time series of original emissions dating back to 1751, we estimate that 87% of CO 2 (f) still circulating in the atmosphere during 2005 was emitted subsequent to 1950.
Steps 3-5 and Final
Step. With our database elaborated to include remaining emissions, we summed each country's remaining emissions from each year to calculate country-level total remaining emissions (step 3). Next, we divided each country's total remaining emissions by the global total of remaining emissions (all countries, all years), yielding a "percentage of world" for each country (step 4). We then multiplied these percentages by the RF for the corresponding GHG to compute country-level IND CO2(f) or IND CH4 (step 5).
We thus parse the total global natural debts of CO 2 (f) and CH 4 across countries believing that the practical and theoretical difficulties, in addition to the vexing complications discussed above (Natural Debt, Review of Historical Accountabilities, and International Natural Debt), of determining and assigning emissions previous to 1950 would outweigh any minor improvement in nominal accuracy that might result. The distribution derived from the post-1950 period is therefore used as an estimate of the full distribution of remaining CO 2 (f) and CH 4 LUCF. Our LUCF dataset was derived from the most recent update to Houghton (74, 75) and estimates net CO 2 fluxes resulting from human-induced LUCF at a region-level (defined in Supporting Information). Once again, we focused only on the 1950-2005 portion of time series. The methods for calculating the annual LUCF fluxes of CO 2 are described elsewhere in greater detail (e.g., ref. 76) . Here, we note that the analysis (i) draws on a vast array of land use statistics from agencies and researchers; (ii) models carbon fluxes for multiple native ecosystems per region; (iii) accounts for changes in living and dead carbon (above and below ground), harvested wood products, and soils; and (iv) incorporates time lags for the decay of biomass and soil carbon and regrowth of secondary forests following wood harvest and agricultural abandonment. Thus, the net flux of CO 2 for a given region-year may be either positive (net CO 2 source) or negative (net CO 2 sink). The LUCF dataset does not include fluxes of CO 2 from ecosystems undisturbed by human activity. Nor does it include the effects of environmental change (e.g., CO 2 fertilization, climate change, nitrogen deposition) on CO 2 fluxes.
To harmonize the different spatial scales of our datasets (country-level versus region-level), we added IND CH4 for all countries within a region to arrive at region-level IND CH4 values. However, for CO 2 (f) we followed a slightly different process to accommodate negative values for LUCF. Within each region, we added member countries' yearly CO 2 (f) original emissions to create region-level time series. Next, we combined region-level CO 2 (f) and LUCF time series, adding or subtracting as warranted, to generate a unified CO 2 , or CO 2 (f)+LUCF, time series. With these CO 2 (f)+LUCF timeseries of original emissions, we then followed the procedure outlined above in steps 1-5, to eventually generate region-level IND CO2(f)+LUCF values. Last, summing each region's IND CO2(f)+LUCF and IND CH4 yielded its IND CO2(f)+LUCF+CH4 .
